The aim of the following article is to provide a descriptive evaluation of the fundamental claims and assumptions of scientific and religious instrumentalism and to discuss the theses they put forward regarding the relationship between religion and science. The scientific instrumentalism presented here is only one branch of contemporary philosophy of science. Therefore, it should be kept in mind that the perspective on the status of science and scientific theories proposed by this approach does not reflect the entirety of discussions in contemporary philosophy of science. This cautionary note also applies to religious instrumentalism, which adopts a similar approach to the legitimacy and validity of religious beliefs. According to this view, religious beliefs are functional propositions that regulate an individual’s spiritual life and ensure the moral control of society. Roughly speaking, religious instrumentalism represents the final stage in the process of reducing religion to a system of moral propositions, a process that emerged in Western thought. In the conclusion, a critical evaluation will be made regarding the close relationship between religious instrumentalism and postmodernist religious understanding, particularly addressing the way the postmodernist discourse bypasses the concept of religion.
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In the modern era, religion and science have been presented as two opposing forms of knowledge and ways of life, with the choice of one over the other often regarded as an inevitable category. The underlying assumption behind this separation is that religion and science represent two distinct epistemic processes and structures, or, using Wittgenstein’s term, two different language-games and ways of life. Although different language-games cannot claim superiority or validity over one another, the positivist view of science has treated its own values as the only criteria for true knowledge and ways of living, maintaining its dominance until recent times. Some movements that do not accept the classical positivist scientific model have developed new approaches regarding the function and value of science and scientific theories. One of these movements, scientific instrumentalism, not only proposes its own criteria for the epistemic value of scientific theories, but also seems to contribute to the discussions on the relationship between science and religion.
Scientific Instrumentalism
The fundamental claim of scientific instrumentalism is that scientific theories are nothing more than instruments/tools used in scientific research. Theories are important and necessary as long as they serve the function of providing a scientific description of the universe. The role of theories in physics, chemistry, or astronomy is to make scientific explanations more appropriate and systematic. In this sense, theories are indispensable elements for scientific research. However, the main point of the instrumentalist view is that theories do not have any function other than guiding, and they do not serve the function or value of reflecting phenomena as they are or summarizing complex experimental data. The instrumentalist view does not consider theories as summaries of experimental data collected from the external world because this assumes a reciprocal relationship between theory and fact. The instrumentalist rejects the identity relationship between theory and physical reality. In parallel with these assumptions, the thesis that theories can be translated into the language of observation and experience is replaced by the thesis that the relationship between theories and physical entities is not ontological but instrumental. With this stance, scientific instrumentalism goes beyond the well-known distinction between observational and theoretical terms. The idea that observation is theory-dependent and theory-laden refers to an epistemic situation. The instrumentalist stance regarding theoretical entities aims to dismantle the ontological foundation of these entities.
The main idea underlying these theses of instrumentalism is the rejection of the idea that the categories of truth and falsehood are applicable to theories and science. Advocates of scientific instrumentalism, such as Van Fraassen, argue that theories do not have any ontological foundation or reality. Contrary to the claims of realists, theories do not correspond to objective entities that exist independently of the theoretical assumptions and constructions of scientists. Since theories do not rest on any objective ontological foundation, they cannot be evaluated as true or false. At this point, the instrumentalist stands in opposition to the realist view that science (or, in this case, theory) aims at “truth.” According to the instrumentalist, whether it is “true” in the realist sense or “similar” (verisimilitude) in the Popperian sense, the concept of “truth” in science should be excluded from the discussion. In this context, instrumentalism is an extension of anti-realism, as both views generally reject the ontological foundation and reality of science, and specifically, scientific theories. Similarly, we cannot claim that theoretical entities such as electrons, protons, etc., really exist. As the name suggests, these are “theoretical” entities, and once the term “theoretical” is defined in an instrumentalist sense, the ontological foundation and reality of theories and theoretical entities cannot be proven.
Although instrumentalism does not grant any ontological or even epistemic status to theories, it does acknowledge that some theories are more preferable than others. This is where instrumentalism differs from anti-realism regarding the possibility that some theories might be superior to others. The absence of an ontological foundation does not eliminate the functional value and superiority of some theories. Some theories are preferred not because they are closer to “truth,” but because, like tools we use in everyday life, they perform better functions. In short, some theories are superior to others because they are “useful” in scientific research and serve an instrumental function. To make an analogy, scientific theories can be compared to signs and exclamations in everyday language. Wittgenstein says, “Every sign is dead in itself.” “What gives it life? It is alive when it is used. Is life blown into it here (when it is used), or is the use its life?” Theories detached from their function and use in scientific research are like dead objects; they come to life and become meaningful when used as linguistic tools.
At this point, it is important to highlight a challenge faced by the realist stance regarding scientific theories. This challenge is the existence of two or more theories that can equally encompass and explain the same domain of facts (see Figure 1). Using Kuhn’s terminology, the history of science has many examples of such cases within different paradigms. In this context, the instrumentalist argues that when theories are considered as tools used for calculation and prediction, the scientist will not face any issue when confronted with conflicting theories. Moreover, when taken as tools, different theories about the same phenomenon will avoid being irreconcilable, as none of the theories has an ontological foundation in the empirical world.
The second advantage of the instrumentalist view is that no theory is considered the “final word” regarding theoretical or non-theoretical objects. The history of science has many examples of this, as seen in the Newtonian and Einsteinian conceptions of the universe. In these cases, a theory was once accepted as absolutely correct, but later developments resulted in that theory being replaced by another. The instrumentalist stance would protect the scientist from encountering such paradoxical and inconsistent situations.
To summarize, theories, in particular, and science in general, are intellectual tools used for purposes such as calculation, classification, and prediction. Theories are used in scientific research, and in this sense, they are indispensable for the scientist. However, they are not absolute and correct reflections or representations of the objects they attempt to explain. The sole function and importance of theories is to assist us in better understanding and explaining the universe. Using Nagel’s expression, in instrumentalism, theories are not the imagined maps of a particular domain of nature, but rather the principles of map-making. Therefore, neither scientific theories specifically, nor science in general, can be assigned the paradoxical role of being a counter-proof to any philosophical, theological, or moral proposition.
Religious instrumentalism’s fundamental proposition is the same as that of scientific instrumentalism. According to the principle of verification, since the truth of religious propositions cannot be proven, the criteria of truth or falsehood must be excluded for religious beliefs. The verification principle of logical positivists asserts that no statement is meaningful unless it can be empirically verified. A religious statement or proposition must be subject to the same kind of empirical verification as any physical or chemical experiment; that is, elements such as observation, experimentation, and classification are of primary importance in both verifications. When this verification principle is accepted as the sole criterion for truth and meaning, religious, moral, or metaphysical statements cannot have meaning or “truth-value”; they are, as logical positivists declare, meaningless metaphysical nonsense. However, the functional role of religious belief and moral rules in the regulation of social life cannot easily and dismissively be rejected. This functional role actually refers to an empirical direction. Therefore, the only thing an empiricist can do, as in the example of Braithwaite, is to explain and interpret religious truths and moral principles based on the role they play in the organization and control of society.
According to the verification principle, religious beliefs and claims must be considered as propositions and statements with a specific empirical content in order to prove whether they are true or false. According to Braithwaite, there are three valid classes of statements for the truth-value test: statements about empirical facts, scientific hypotheses, and other empirical statements, and finally, logically necessary statements of logic and mathematics. The key issue here is whether religious statements fall into one of these three classes. Religious claims cannot be included in the class of empirical propositions because the subjects of religious statements (God, angels, the afterlife, etc.) are not phenomena that can be observed or experimented upon. Being outside the realm of observation and experimentation pushes the subjects of religious propositions, unlike chemical or biological objects, outside the domain of empirical testing. On the other hand, if we consider these religious propositions as scientific hypotheses and empirical statements about the empirical world, they should be regarded as falsifiable and rejectable propositions if refuted by experiment.
However, such a conclusion inherently destroys the structure of religious truth, which is transcendental and immutable by nature. The last option is to accept religious statements as logically necessary propositions, like those of logic and mathematics. But religious belief then faces a much more serious problem, which is the issue of the ontological status of the propositions of logic and mathematics. Following Hume and Kant, according to this evaluation, the propositions of logic and mathematics are indispensable for understanding and organizing the world of facts, yet they are hypothetical constructs that do not correspond to any objective basis or existence in the external world. If religious statements are included in this category, they must be considered as hypothetical and instrumental objects that do not make any claim to actual objective existence.
In this context, religious claims must be rejected as unverifiable and therefore meaningless metaphysical statements. However, as mentioned above, religious beliefs cannot easily be set aside due to their regulatory role and power in society. At this point, Braithwaite, in an attempt to save the appearance, proposes a new definition of meaning taken from Wittgenstein’s later philosophy: “The meaning of a statement is determined by how it is used.” Since the “use” of a religious or theological statement has an empirical content, this use itself is something that can be observed, heard, and tested. For example, the intention of a religious believer to adhere to a religious or moral political stance can be tested by observing their actions and behavior. Similarly, empirical responses can be obtained. Thus, according to this criterion, which is similar to a pragmatist approach, what makes religious and religious propositions “meaningful” is the believer’s intention, and the truth or falsity of the stated intentions and beliefs does not have any significance.
Since the meaning of religious statements is determined by the intention of the believer, religious propositions lack meaning unless they are linked to the subject of the believer’s intention. “The meaning of a religious claim is determined by its use in expressing the intention of the person making the claim to follow a specific moral political agenda.” The specific moral political agenda refers to moral principles; because the intention of the person making the claim to follow a certain pattern of behavior cannot be arbitrary or subjective. More importantly, religious beliefs and claims only acquire “empirical” content (the role of regulating society) when they are linked to a set of moral principles. Religious statements, like the parables and stories in the Holy Scriptures, do not inherently have any truth-content or value, and only become meaningful when reduced to moral commands and prohibitions. “The primary function (use) of a religious claim is to declare adherence to a set of moral principles: Without such an adherence, there is no ‘true religion.’”
As seen up to this point, the empirical foundation and content necessary for the verification of religious beliefs are provided by two elements: the intention of the person making the claim to follow a specific moral political agenda, and moral principles with an empirical content, such as the organization of society. However, it is an undeniable fact that these two conditions are common to all religions and shared by all religions. If this is the case for fundamental religious statements, how will the differences between religions be explained? If the intention of the person making the claim and the moral principles they must follow are not arbitrary or subjective, how can the existence of religions such as Christianity, Judaism, or Buddhism be explained? In other words, given the shared common points among major religions concerning general moral principles, how will religious differentiation be explained? Braithwaite’s answer is the different “stories” told by religions: “…. The intention to follow the same moral political agenda for different religions is considered alongside different stories (or collections of stories).” According to this, the difference between the stories told to explain the fundamental beliefs of each religion is the cause of differentiation between religions. Here, the term “story” refers to “a proposition or system of propositions that can be empirically tested, directly an empirical proposition, and thought together with the determination to maintain the way of life prescribed by the religion by the religious person.”
The stories have an empirical content because they refer to a specific event, person, and place; however, this does not mean that they must be true. The purpose of these stories, which vary from one religion to another, is not to explain the religious belief itself, but to serve as a functional tool in the religious life of the believer.
In summary, religious instrumentalism entirely rejects the categories of truth and falsehood in religious beliefs. A religious claim, belief, or practice is not required to have the “truth-content” but to perform a function in the individual’s and society’s moral life. Due to the element of use (which is closely related in meaning to “benefit” and “pragmatism” in this context), religious expressions must be linked to a system of moral principles. The inevitable consequence of this acceptance is the reduction of religion, in general, and religious belief, in particular, to a system of moral principles that makes no claims of truth or falsehood. This religion and morality without metaphysics play a functional role in the control of society, and any metaphysical or theological effort beyond this is meaningless.
The religious instrumentalism we have tried to explain so far is a result of accepting the principle of verification as the sole criterion for true and valid knowledge. However, if we set aside logical positivism, the consideration of religion and religious belief as a regulatory principle in individual and social life can be traced back to Kant’s concept of the categorical imperative. Kant’s distinction between pure and practical reason, and his declaration that the metaphysical foundation of religion and morality belongs to the noumenal realm, which is beyond both our knowledge and our interest, made the reduction of religion to morality inevitable. Despite Kant’s intention to establish a moral-based system, it is an undeniable fact that his stance undermined the metaphysical foundations of religious belief and morality. Just as Kant’s terminology of “Ideas” refers to the necessary tools for understanding the world, religious beliefs and moral propositions, without claiming any metaphysical existence, serve a similar function in social life. Thus, religious belief, as a result of the modern understanding of religion, is replaced by moral principles. Moreover, moral values belong to the domain of practical reason, and the term “practical” itself encompasses a regulatory and functional element. The regulatory moral principles that find their legitimacy not in a supra-subjective foundation, but in the subject’s sense of perfection and responsibility, lead us to a moral system devoid of religious-metaphysical foundations. In short, religion is obligated to fulfill a regulatory function. Religion is only possible and meaningful as a system of moral principles.
The rejection of the categories of truth and falsehood for religious beliefs can be similarly applied in the effort to construct religion as an independent language-game. One of the proponents of this view, D. Z. Phillips, argues that the meaning criterion in religion must be created within religion itself. This can only be realized when religion is understood as a language-game in the sense Wittgenstein intended. At this point, Braithwaite’s empiricism and Phillips’ language-games strategy, although differing in methods, share significant similarities: Any evaluation regarding truth and falsehood (right and wrong) should either be completely abandoned or limited to the specific religion in question. Phillips explains this view by referring to the ontological relativism notion inherent in the concept of language-games. Since each language-game has its own specific rules, no general and universal truth or falsity criterion can be referred to in order to validate or justify any religious or non-religious statement. As Wittgenstein said, each language-game can be a complete and self-contained language in itself. This stance turns religion into a worldview that has no right to claim superiority over other language-games. At this point, it becomes possible to talk about the “intelligibility” criterion inherent in language-games and the impossibility of invalidating one language-game’s intelligibility through the intelligibility criteria of another language-game. This ontological relativism, which requires a detailed study, clearly equates with the elimination of religion’s metaphysical structure and foundation.
Conclusion
As can be understood from the evaluations so far, there are some common points shared by scientific and religious instrumentalism. Both approaches view their subjects as contingent and relative, rather than absolute and universal. Both regard the criteria of truth and falsehood as tools (instruments) that lead to other unnecessary purposes, in the functioning of science and religion. Finally, both approaches are anti-realist. Generally speaking, setting aside the criticism of instrumentalism for now, it can be argued that scientific instrumentalism offers some practical applications, especially when there is a contradiction or conflict between science and religion. In such a case of conflict, one possible strategy is to relativize science according to the perspective of instrumentalism and consider the theory causing the conflict as an instrumental and contingent element. Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) adopts such an approach in the face of scientific theories that conflict with religion. When a scientific theory is set against religion, Duhem argues, the best way is not to change or reconsider religious belief, but to regard the theory in question as a tool. Considering the historical replacement of old theories and even paradigms with newer ones, this attitude towards scientific theories seems legitimate and justified. This neither harms religious belief nor the scientific theory. Known for his distinction between physics and metaphysics, Duhem describes his own interpretation of physics as “positivist in terms of both results and sources,” but also expresses his belief in religion by saying, “I believe in the truths revealed to us by God with all my soul.” In this framework, the supposed conflict between religion and science gains a different direction and content.
As for religious instrumentalism, we previously argued that interpreting religion in an instrumentalist framework and reducing it to moral principles constitutes one of the key characteristics of the Western understanding of religion. According to this view, religion defined by divine revelation refers not to an absolute and transcendent reality that carries all its moral principles within itself, but to an institution tasked with moral control and regulation. Since the Enlightenment became the dominant discourse of Western civilization, the Western self-concept has tended to see religious truth as functional and instrumental. The “religious element” in Enlightenment thinkers points to such a conception of religion, rather than religious truth. As Heidegger said about Nietzsche’s “God is dead” slogan, this is not just a declaration of atheism, but signifies the forgetfulness of God and the reduction of God to an ordinary position.
At this point, it is necessary to take a look at the relationship between modernism and postmodernism. Contrary to the widespread and misleading belief that no intellectual movement is as radical and destructive as postmodernism in its critique of modernism, both modernism and postmodernism share a common point regarding the status of religion. The postmodern discourse places religion among the “society-responsible institutions.” A postmodern religion, which does not have any transcendent foundation, must respond to the current situation and problems faced by humanity. Otherwise, metaphysical and theological truths, such as God or the afterlife, must be abandoned like other “metanarratives.” It should be noted here that religion is defined by something other than absolute transcendental truth and that it has legitimacy for other reasons. The legitimacy of religion is provided by the role it plays in the salvation of the human community.
Setting aside the details and nuances of “postmodern religion” for now, another vital problem that arises here is the ontological relativism shared by both instrumentalism and postmodernism.
It is true that the postmodernist discourse grants religion a certain domain of existence, and this is what makes postmodernism attractive to many. However, it must be strongly emphasized that the acceptance of religion in postmodern discourse is not based on a moral, but on an ontological relativist stance. This means that religion is as meaningful and legitimate as any other discourse. However, within this framework, religion has legitimacy not as a transcendent truth defined by divine revelation, but as “an institution responsible to society.” Therefore, to reiterate, the pluralism advocated by postmodernism is based not on a moral stance or tolerance, but on ontological relativism. For these reasons, the postmodernist understanding of religion, like religious instrumentalism, carries an attitude contrary to the fundamental structure and reality of religion, as much as modernism does, despite the seemingly sympathetic discourse of postmodernism, and this must be confessed and acknowledged.
Taken from an issue of Divan: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies published in 1996.
